Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, "homeland 
INTRODUCTION
In his 1994 novel "Debt of Honor," Tom Clancy describes the near total annihilation of all three branches of the U.S. government by a pilot who plunges a commercial airliner onto the Capitol building during the State of the Union speech by a U.S. President. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists plunged commercial airliners into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, and onto a wing of the Pentagon. The U.S. government then declared war against terror, and has taken numerous actions and measures to prevent a repeat of similar attacks in the U.S. and against U.S. interests outside the U.S. The U.S. launched wars against Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress passed the Patriots Act to make it easier for the U.S. government to monitor and arrest terrorist suspects. The U.S. created a mammoth Department of Homeland Security to consolidate many of the government agencies that perform func-
The Difficulties
Despite the determined and massive efforts by the U.S. government, it is clear that it simply is impossible to prevent all forms of terrorist attacks. This is the case even for a small country like Israel, as demonstrated by the incessant series of suicide bombings in Israel by Palestine militants during the past few years. The problem is immensely bigger for the U.S., because of the size of its land, borders and population. It is further compounded because the U.S. is founded on freedom, and is the hub of the world economy, with tens of millions of visitors and hundreds of millions of cargo containers and packages entering the country every year. Given all this, it is actually amazing that for more than three years no dreaded attack has taken place.
Let us review major difficulties in protecting the U.S. from terrorist attacks. The discussion is to serve as a basis for subsequent discussions of the roles of technologies in partially addressing some of the difficulties. There are many terrorist organizations around the world, including Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansar al-Islam, Islamic Jihad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al Haramain Brigades, Chechen rebels and so forth, and even anti-government militants in the U.S. (New York Times, 2004) . For the purpose of this paper, terror refers to massive or a series of killings of unarmed civilians or destructions of properties by any means to disrupt the normal daily lives of people to achieve some objectives. For expository simplicity, terror threats referred to in this paper are those posed against the U.S. and U.S. interests abroad by Al Qaeda and those closely collaborating with them, both within and outside the U.S. However, the observations and conclusions made in this paper apply to terror threats from all terror organizations.
The terrorists are faceless, and are supported and shielded by Islamic militants and their sympathizers around the world. They are not a nation state, but tens of thousands of Islamic militants loosely organized as small independently operating cells in various countries, including the Middle East, Western Europe, South Asia and even in the U.S.
There are many demonstrated and potential means of terrorist attacks, including turning commercial airliners into "guided" missiles, suicide bombings in crowded places, planting or mailing biological or chemical agents, detonating radiological devices in a metropolitan area, shooting down commercial airliners with shoulder-launched rockets, planting bombs in commercial or cargo airliners to blow them up mid-flight, poisoning the food supply or water supply, blowing up petroleum transmission pipelines, setting fire on subway trains, spraying deadly chemicals over a city or a large sports stadium from a crop duster airplane, blowing up a giant cruise ship in the middle of an ocean, and so forth.
There is an uncountable number of soft targets , especially in large cities (e.g., office buildings, government buildings, restaurants, hotels, shopping centers, concert halls, sports stadiums, theme parks, bridges and tunnels, power plants, chemical plants, petroleum refineries, symbolic monuments …). It is impossible to fortify them all.
The borders of the U.S. are vast, and it is impossible to prevent determined individuals from entering the U.S. through the Mexican and Canadian borders. It is difficult to detect forged passports at immigration checkpoints.
The number of luggage, bags, packages and containers that are transported, and the number of carriers (people and all means of transportation) overwhelm the human and technological resources to check them. It is impossible to detect all types of explosives, biological and chemical agents, and radiological devices transported through air, sea and land. Technologies for detecting them are inadequate. It is impossible to detect all banned objects in the possession of airline passengers; even guns and knives somehow escape detection.
The security measures currently in effect have lots of holes. Airlines now require that a passenger with checked luggage board the same flight. Although this measure can help prevent terrorists from slipping away after placing explosives in a commercial airliner, it cannot deter suicide bombers. Bottles of wine, which can be shattered and used as a weapon, are allowed in flights. Workers at airports, seaports and trucking firms get access to the airplanes, ships and trucks that carry hazardous materials; it is not clear what the U.S. government does to ensure that none of these people are compromised. Various countries around the world have not adopted stringent security procedures, and terrorists could hijack airliners from such countries to attack targets in the U.S. Only about a year ago has the U.S. started to order suspected flights originating from foreign airports to turn around mid-flight.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Although it is impossible to prevent a future terrorist attack, the U.S. is, rightly, determined to do everything it can to protect its people, its free society and people of other countries from catastrophic terrorist attacks. Even if the procedures, human resources and technologies are inadequate, they can nonetheless deter some attacks. For example, even if one or more terrorists manage to board a flight, if other partners are unable to board the same flight, they are likely to have to abandon their plan. If some of the funding sources are disrupted, terrorists may need to downgrade or altogether cancel plans.
However, identifying terrorists and their supporters, tracking their movements and activities, and tracking the movements of funds and weapons they require are so difficult that the U.S. government has basically adopted the view that everyone who enters or lives in the U.S. is a suspect, and that the U.S. must guard against anything that terrorists have tried or one can imagine that they may try. An 80-year-old Caucasian lady is searched at the airport. All foreigners, except those from 27 countries with "visa waiver" agreement with the U.S., get fingerprinted and photographed upon arrival in U.S. airports and seaports. The use of a commercial airliner as a missile is on top of the list of potential means of attacks against the U.S. Because the Sep-tember 11 terrorists used box cutters to threaten airline crews, box cutters are not allowed on board. Uniformed security guards are stationed at airport terminals, and thick concrete blocks often shield airport terminals. After one Al Qaeda member tried clumsily to detonate C4 plastic bombs hidden in his shoes during a flight, all shoes of all airline passengers are Xrayed. Hundreds of thousands of revelers who gathered in New York City's Times Square to celebrate the start of the new year had to go through X-ray machines. The Department of Homeland Security announced that on the first day of fingerprinting and photographing foreign visitors at U.S. airports and seaports, they had "21 hits"; but none of them was a terrorist suspect and none of them was even a threat to U.S. national security. The current vigilance against terrorist attacks is not meant to capture divorced husbands for non-payment of alimony, drivers who had unpaid parking tickets, and so forth.
The price of vigilance is staggering. The cost includes human resources deployed (screeners, security guards, translators, intelligence analysts …), investment in and purchase of technologies, all the time that people waste getting screened, foreign aids (to seek cooperation from countries like Pakistan, and to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq), human lives lost in two wars, and so forth. The number of innocent people and innocuous packages and containers being subjected to all the screening is staggering. The cost to the airlines of canceled flights due to false intelligence is going to mount. Clearly, all these costs are being balanced against the consequences of another devastating attack on the soil of the U.S. However, the U.S. government should make serious efforts to reduce the cost of vigilance, in terms of money and individual freedom. In particular, the U.S. government must gather and develop more precise and accurate intelligence about terrorists and their activities. Better intelligence can prevent needless cancellation of flights, detention of innocent people, elevation of the national terror alert level, and so forth; and instead, help focus resources on more likely suspects, containers, targets, and so forth. One way to gather and develop more precise and accurate intelligence is to make better use of databases and existing database and related technologies, and to enhance the technologies.
USE OF DATABASE AND DATABASE TECHNOLOGY

Sources of Homeland Security Databases
Although many of the things that terrorists and their supporters do leave no records or cooperative witnesses, many do leave records and witnesses. Such records and witness accounts are captured and stored in computers, transmitted and analyzed. Let us review the essential needs and activities of terrorists. The discussion is to summarize the sources of databases that can be queried, searched and mined.
First, terrorists need to travel. They need to attend meetings to plan attacks, scout out targets of potential attacks, plan escapes, and so forth. To travel overseas, they need to acquire passports and visas. Entry and departure records are stored in the databases of the U.S. government, now along with photographs and fingerprints. Records are also left in the databases of airline companies and stores in the airports. To travel within a country, they may buy/ borrow/rent cars and fly. Domestic travel can leave records in the databases of airline companies, rental car companies and hotels. Travel by stolen automobiles, buses, trains, taxis, and so forth where the fares are paid for in cash, does not leave records; however, it may still leave witnesses.
Second, terrorists need to communicate. They communicate within a cell, across cells and with the leadership that supports and directs the cells. They communicate via couriers, cell phones (including throwaway cell phones), satellite phones, e-mails (from Internet cafes or their own computers), Internet chat rooms, and so forth. Their communications are often coded, and may even be included in newspaper ads. Coded messages (e.g., "brother coming to dinner" to mean "a courier is arriving with money or weapon") typically require experienced human analysts to detect and interpret. Messages communicated via human couriers and coded messages in public media are usually not captured. However, the U.S. government is capable of intercepting most of the electronic communications (e-mails, facsimile, phone calls) around the world using such systems as the NSA's Echelon and the FBI's Carnivore systems. Such systems store all intercepted communications and have automatic translation capabilities to and from various languages. However, automated translation technology is not adequate, the volumes of data to be translated are overwhelming and the number of qualified translators is limited. Moreover, tracking down callers who use throwaway cell phones is difficult at best.
Third, terrorists need money. They need money to subsist, travel, acquire certain skills (e.g., flying lessons, foreign language lessons) and weapons, and so forth. Most likely, they would not resort to theft or robbery to get money (as it risks capture). Instead, they depend on finances from wealthy supporters. The money often gets wired through a series of banks in different countries to make detection difficult. The movements of money, especially in large amounts (more than $10,000), leave records in the databases of banks. However, money carried on persons is difficult to spot. Terrorists would prefer to use cash where possible, as uneventful cash purchases are not likely to leave records or draw attention. Where cash purchase is not accepted, such as airline ticketing and automobile rental, they will be forced to use credit cards. They are likely to open and close lots of valid credit card accounts.
Fourth, terrorists need to have weapons smuggled to them. The weapons include knives, guns and bombs, and, less likely, shoulder-launched rockets, biological and chemical agents, and radiological and nuclear devices. The more deadly weapons move through black-market weapons dealers, often with contacts in certain governments. These are transported in trucks, ships and airplanes. Terrorists who carry out the shootings, bombings and activating weapons of mass destruction are likely to move about without weapons, and have the weapons delivered to them sometime before attacks. Detecting the movements of weapons through underground channels is difficult, especially when weapons are disassembled into seemingly innocuous components or detection technologies are inadequate. The U.S. government no doubt has records of underground weapons dealers and foreign government agents involved in the selling and buying of weapons. The records of transporting packages and containers are captured in the databases of shipping companies, airline companies, trucking firms, and so forth.
One obvious observation from the above review of the needs and activities of terrorists is that terrorists are only a very tiny fraction of all otherwise innocent people who engage in travel, communication, ship-ping and purchasing activities daily everywhere in the world. As such, the records left by terrorists and their supporters too are a very tiny fraction of all records left by non-terrorists. It is a huge challenge to pick out those records that pertain to terrorist suspects and their activities from the humongous databases of all travel, communication, shipping and purchasing records that are generated daily all over the world.
Another obvious observation is that only parts of the activities and movements of terrorists and supporters, and movements of funds and weapons, can be captured and stored in databases. This underscores the importance of making the best use of all available databases, and making the databases more useful by enhancing them with additional helpful data.
Homeland Security Databases
As discussed above, there are numerous sources of archival data relevant to homeland security. Some of the data are stored in government databases, while others are stored in customer and transaction databases of corporations. They can be queried and used to compute statistical results to establish patterns or discover outlier data (i.e., unusual patterns, such as trips across multiple countries in a short duration). These databases are not integrated into a single "centralized" database; instead, they remain independent. Some of the databases are managed by database systems, while others are managed by file systems. Today's major commercial database systems, such as Oracle, IBM DB2, IBM/ Informix Dynamic Server, Microsoft SQL Server and Sybase, are relational and object-relational systems. Database systems allow queries for records that satisfy simple search conditions (e.g., name or passport number or age range) or complex combinations of conditions (e.g., date and location, age and nationality). The huge volumes of electronic communications intercepted around the clock by the NSA and the FBI are probably stored in specialized file systems. Certain data of interest that are extracted from these may be loaded in database and file systems for further processing and analyses.
Query tools (also called report tools), which run on top of database systems, provide a user-friendly interface for posing queries against a database and displaying the query results in various visual forms (e.g., a pie chart, bar chart, scatter plots). Vendors that offer query tools include Cognos, Business Objects, and so forth.
Databases include not only alphanumeric data but also multimedia data. Multimedia data of relevance to homeland security include textual documents, images, video, audio and speech. Images, in particular, include photographs, satellite images, biometric data, scanned documents, and so forth. Specialized multimedia content recognition software is used to match sample images or audio/speech fragments against stored data. Although some such software (e.g., Virage and Convera) has been loosely combined with some database systems and Internet search engines, they are typically used independently of database systems. Textual documents include news articles, memos, e-mails, forms of a wide variety, and so forth. Document management systems store and retrieve textual documents, while digital asset management systems store and retrieve multimedia files. Vendors that provide document management and digital asset management systems include FileNet, OpenText, Documentum, Interwoven, Stellent, Vignette, and so forth.
Homeland security applications are built on top of database and file systems. Some applications would run against huge permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
archival databases, while many others would run against much smaller databases derived from archival databases. For example, a database of suspected terrorists that various government agencies no doubt maintain would be obviously much smaller than an archival database of all the people. Some of the applications are connected with geographical information systems in order to correlate alphanumeric data with geographical data (e.g., map of a country, map of a city, and so forth.). Such applications would display in visual form the flows of money, movements of weapons, travel patterns of terrorists, and so forth. Smith & King (2005) discuss a database interface for link-analysis applications that are designed to detect patterns from a network of objects such as people or banks.
Making Homeland Security Databases More Helpful
Governments and corporations all over the world have accumulated huge amounts of data in databases. They use a variety of database systems and file systems to store, retrieve and update the databases. There are three major problems with these databases, including the ones relevant to homeland security. First, data that should be in a single database is usually scattered about in many different databases. A particular department of a U.S. state government maintains 150 different databases, some in personal databases on personal computers, and others in enterprise databases on servers. Second, databases contain dirty data. Some data are wrong, missing, outdated or inconsistent with other data, and so forth. Third, lots of data are lost, although they are stored somewhere. This is because metadata about stored data, and use of metadata, is inadequate. These problems with existing databases relevant to homeland security must be understood and addressed urgently. Fixing these problems will require massive efforts. Let us examine these problems.
During the past several years, corporations have been interested in achieving a "360-degree" view of their customers; that is, consolidating all data about each customer to support all "customer-facing" operations, such as customer support, sales, marketing, and so forth. This is the goal of today's customer relationship management systems. Similarly, the U.S. government needs a "360-degree" view of each terrorist suspect and supporting organization. To enable a 360-degree view of terrorists and supporters, all data relevant to homeland security should logically be in a single, centralized database. However, it is not feasible or even desirable to copy them all into a single database. However, in order to enable easy access to multiple databases, some of the disparate databases need to be partially integrated. There are two ways to integrate independent databases. One is data warehousing. Selected parts of disparate databases are copied and, after appropriate transformations of the structure and formats of the data, loaded into a single database. Another is database federation. Independent databases remain independent databases, but users are allowed to access them as a virtually integrated database (database federation will be discussed in the next section). Data warehousing technology is mature today, with several major vendors on the market, such as Informatica, Ascential Software, Cognos, Business Objects, IBM, NCR, Computer Associates/Platinum, and so forth. Many large corporations and government agencies have created data warehouses or data marts (departmental data warehouses) during the past several years. Data warehousing technology includes data warehouse design, data migration and periodic refreshing of the data warehouse. Data migration is done using ETL (extract, transform and load) tools.
The dirty-data, or data-quality, problem arises basically for two reasons: erroneous input and failure to update data when necessary. It is difficult to ensure that all data in a database are correct and current. Humans invariably make errors in data entry, such as misspelling, mistyping, leaving certain fields blank, and so forth. Some data may be entered in a wrong format or wrong unit. As most of the suspected terrorists and their supporters are from predominantly Islamic countries, their names are rather unfamiliar to Americans. The English transliterations of their names are often badly mangled and spelled in many different ways by different people. Thompson (2005) discusses problems and solutions in name matching in further detail. If a rental-car reservations agent enters a name as "Ayman el-Zawahiri," but another agent queries the database for "Aman el Zawari," "Ayman el-Zawahiri" will not be found. If the values in a certain field (e.g., nationality) are left blank, queries with a search condition on the field will not find those records with blanks in the field, and those records will also be left out of any statistical computations involving the field. Some data (e.g., a terrorist suspect's address, recent travel dates) are time-varying, and failure to update them at the right time can make them not helpful. No doubt the databases relevant to homeland security contain all types of dirty data, and these must be cleansed. As some data are copied from other data, all databases that contain the same errors need to be identified and cleansed.
Terrorists most likely would use multiple falsified names to confuse those who track them. Although one may argue that this is not really dirty data, in some sense it is, and in any case, it is a problem that needs to be addressed. To address this type of problem, "verification" information may be used. For example, a person's biometric data can be stored along with whatever name and passport number the person may volunteer.
Metadata includes various descriptions about stored data (e.g., who entered the data and when, what the data is about, what software was used to enter the data …), where the data is stored (folder name and path to the folder) and in what format, and so forth. When metadata is not properly maintained or used, stored data may become inaccessible. Many people experience this problem with e-mails and documents they store, both in electronic and hard copy form. Sometime after storing emails and documents, people often forget where they stored them. If they keep some type of metadata about them (e.g., a directory), they would have a much better chance of finding them again.
People use a certain classification scheme and abbreviated names matching the semantic contents to name folders and files. The trouble is that people keep changing the classification scheme and semantic abbreviations. This is another reason stored data can become lost. For example, a person may read an article about the use of RFID tags by the Department of Defense. At the time, the person's interest is in homeland security, and naturally saves the article under "homeland security -> RFID." Several months later, the same person becomes interested in a variety of emerging technologies (e.g., nanotechnology, fuel cells, optical switching, RFID), and finds some articles about RFID technology. He then saves the articles under "emerging technologies -> RFID." In this way, he will have created two different "folders" to save articles on RFID. If he does not remember all the folders he has created, some articles may become lost.
One urgent, and massive, task is for the U.S. government to examine the status of the metadata for all stored data relevant to homeland security, and clean it up. Where metadata does not exist, it should be created. Where metadata is sparse, it should be expanded properly. Where metadata is wrong, it should be corrected. Further, a hierarchical taxonomy of terms relevant to homeland security (e.g. high-value target, suspects, enemy combatant, C4 explosives …) needs to be created. Such a taxonomy can be used to segment the stored data and to provide a hierarchical search path for stored data.
Improving Database Technology
Despite a quarter-century of advances, today's database systems are missing some important capabilities that would be helpful to supporting homeland security applications. These capabilities are topics of research and development. Such capabilities are outlined and motivated by Kim (2003) . They include database federation, metadata management, data quality and fuzzy querying. Each of these capabilities is discussed in this section, along with suggestions for research directions. Some of these capabilities can be incorporated into the database engine, while others should be supported in applications. Database system vendors upgrade their database engines to meet the requirements of a broad segment of current and future customers. As database engines are very complex, vendors are reluctant to make significant changes lightly. Unless the U.S. government is ready to have a specialized "homeland-security database system" developed and subsequently maintained for many years, it should use commercial database systems offered by vendors such as Oracle, IBM, Microsoft and Sybase. Further, some of the "database enhancements" suggested by some researchers are, rather than enhancements to database engines, database management or data-processing techniques that should be implemented in new homeland security applications. Some applications would run on top of database systems.
Database Federation
When an application must access data in multiple databases, but the databases are not warehoused, the standard way to work around the problem is to access one database at a time and construct the result manually. For example, an FBI agent may access an FBI terrorist database and, after obtaining a list of suspects, may call up his counterpart in the CIA. The CIA analyst then may access a CIA terrorist database to look for information about the suspects supplied by the FBI agent. When the FBI agent receives the information from the CIA analyst, he merges the results and arrives at some conclusion. Sometimes this is the best way. However, under certain circumstances, this may be unacceptable; for example, if the suspect list is long and there is no time to contact the right person. In other words, it may often be desirable for a user to be able to access multiple independent databases as though they are one. The commercial world has found database federation desirable.
Database federation is a rather old concept. There are some database federation products from major vendors such as IBM (Data Joiner) and BEA (Liquid Data), Data Mirror, TIBCO and a number of small vendors such as MetaMatrix, Certive and IPEDO. The established way to achieve database federation is to create a single global schema over all participating independent databases, and allow users to query against the global schema. This gives the illusion of a single integrated database. The query is decomposed into subqueries and each subquery is automatically sent to an appropriate independent database for processing. The results of subqueries are assembled into a single result and delivered to the user. Each of the databases participating in the federation retains its independence, and is administered by its own database administrators. The database administrators of each database must agree to make parts of their database accessible to outside users (i.e., users of other databases). The single global schema includes the schemas of those parts of the independent databases that are authorized to outside users.
Access to sensitive homeland security databases is no doubt tightly controlled. As such, when the number of participating databases becomes large, it can become difficult to control access to the single global schema, or even impractical to create a single global schema. Very few users of one database may have sufficient authority and clearance to access all other participating databases. Further, access to different parts of the single global schema should be carefully authorized to each user. For example, an FBI agent with clearance to access a domestic terrorist database may not have clearance to access a terrorist database owned by the CIA, and vice versa. The interplay between the creation of a single global schema and rigorous access control to participating databases needs to be closely studied.
Where a single global schema does not make sense, another approach to database federation may make sense. In this approach, instead of a single global schema, merely an export schema (i.e., a view) of each independent database is created and exported, and appropriately authorized outside users can access the database via the exported schema. This approach avoids the overhead of designing a single global schema, and yet allows users to access independent databases separately, albeit one at a time. Applications that need to access multiple databases can still be developed on top of multiple export schemas. However, such applications are in general much more complex than those developed on top of a single global schema. Without the single global schema, the applications must manage query processing against multiple databases and also negotiate the complexities of the multiple export schemas. Ultimately, a hybrid solution may be useful that combines the single global schema approach over a small number of participating independent databases, and the export schema approach for each database that does not participate in the global schema.
Data Quality
Despite data typing, integrity constraints, transaction management and triggers, the facilities in today's database systems to ensure correct input and timely update are not adequate. English (2005) discusses various ways that must be pursued in order to enhance the quality of data relevant to national security efforts. To significantly enhance the quality of data, especially in homeland security databases, three capabilities need to be improved. First is to prevent dirty data from entering the database. Second is to identify dirty data that has managed to enter the database. Third is to repair identified dirty data. Let us examine each of these capabilities.
There is a wide variety of data entry errors, such as an entry left blank, misspelling, mistyping, non-standard form of data permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
(e.g., for dates, measures, money), and so forth. Kim, Choi, Hong, Lee and Kim (2003) provide a rather comprehensive taxonomy of dirty data. Customs declaration forms, embarkation and disembarkation forms, and other documents are filled out by humans (travelers), and then transcribed into computers by different humans (immigration agents), opening up opportunities for data entry errors. Police reports, notes taken from interrogation of terrorist suspects, and so forth, are all filled out by humans (usually in free form) and entered into computers (often by other humans). It is impossible to prevent dirty data from entering into a database. However, efforts should and can be made to reduce the level of dirty data that enters a database. One obvious way is to have a set of people double-check data entered by a different set of people. Another is to replace humans with automated readers that read certain types of data and enter them automatically into computers. For example, immigration agents use automated readers to read passports and update records of entry into the U.S., just as automated readers for credit cards, smart cards, and so forth, are used in stores. Database systems can prevent certain types of data entry errors by enforcing integrity rules, such as data types, constraints (e.g., unique value, non-null value), value ranges, and so forth. However, many types of dirty data cannot be mapped to integrity rules. They include spelling mistakes, wrong data and outdated data.
As some types of dirty data are bound to enter a database, it is necessary to be able to identify dirty data after data entry. Given the wide variety of dirty data and the volumes of data involved, sophisticated dirty-data identification software should be developed. However, it is not possible to automate the identification of all types of dirty data with a 100% certainty, and human analysts are required in general. It is difficult even for humans to identify certain types of dirty data. For example, if 'July 15, 1978 ' is entered as a person's date of birth when the person's correct date of birth is 'July 25, 1980,' it is problematic indeed. However, if the data is compared against the same person's records in other databases or even the digitized image of the original hardcopy document from which the person's date-of-birth data has been taken, it becomes possible to identify even this type of dirty data. It is expensive to confirm this and other types of dirty data, whether it is done automatically or by humans. Besides, such redundant data or related data are not always available.
Once dirty data has been identified, it should be repaired. There are a few dirtydata identification and repair products on the market, including Vality, First Logic and Trillium Software. They are designed largely to deal with the names and addresses of people. Many types of dirty data are not amenable to automatic repair. For example, a spelling-and-grammar checker may discover and flag potential mistakes, but it may not discover certain real mistakes and, often, the mistakes it flags turn out not to be mistakes. So, humans must determine which flagged mistakes need to be repaired.
Further, data "travels." A human enters data into some form or document. Possibly another human transcribes some or all of the data into a computer. The data may be copied, transformed, transmitted and saved in other computers. A collection of the same type of data may be summarized and stored in the same or other computers. What this means is that once dirty data are identified and repaired, the same error must be repaired "upstream;" that is, all the sources of data from which the data came. If dirty data is not repaired upstream, it will propagate again when later it is copied or used as basis for a summary snapshot.
Metadata Management
There are interchange standards for many types of domain-specific data, such as EDI, PDM, ODM, and so forth. XML is the most agreed-upon exchange standard for numerous types of data. Metadata for data stored in databases also needs to be exchanged between users and applications. As such, metadata management requires standards, such as the Object Management Group's (OMG) Meta Object Facility (MOF) and Common Warehouse Metamodel (CWM) for modeling metadata, XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) for the interchange of metadata among applications, and perhaps even vocabulary and ontology standards.
There are several vendors that provide metadata repository management products, including Microsoft, Informatica, Computer Associates/Platinum, MetaMatrix, and so forth. Metadata management capabilities are also a natural part of federated database systems. Further, metadata management capabilities are included in product offerings from vendors of data warehousing and business intelligence software, content management software or enterprise application integration software. Metadata management software needs to be tuned to serve the needs of homeland security applications that access a wide variety of data sources. In this context, the first problem to address is to determine what types of metadata are relevant to homeland security. Today, the term metadata is being used very loosely, with the meaning ranging from data definition (schema), to data linage, to business rules and procedures, to even knowledge locked up in people's brains. Then, groupings of legitimate metadata need to be identified, and organizational structures for each such grouping of metadata need to be defined to support navigation and search. Establishing vocabulary and ontology standards would also be helpful.
Fuzzy Querying
Today's database systems are designed to answer "precise" queries. Queries specify "precise" search conditions (e.g., age = 25 and nationality = "Saudi Arabia"), and database systems retrieve only those records that fully satisfy the search conditions. The only exceptions are range queries; that is, queries with search conditions that specify a certain range of values (e.g., age <35, age BETWEEN 15 and 35, name LIKE "el-Zawa"). Of course, precise queries are required for most homeland security applications. However, certain types of homeland security applications would benefit from database systems that can evaluate "fuzzy" queries. A fuzzy query is one that includes imprecise or fuzzy search conditions such that the answer includes all records that are relevant to the fuzzy search conditions. Such expressions as "a person who seems to be from the Middle East," "a tall and skinny person," "a reddish beat-up automobile" and "a person whose name sounds like Saeed" are fuzzy expressions. A query that includes such an expression in search conditions is a fuzzy query.
If database systems do not directly support fuzzy querying, the user must formulate precise queries with possibly a large number of precise search conditions, or must manually scan a large database. To look for "a tall and skinny person," one may specify precise search conditions "height >5.10 and weight <150"; mapping this type of fuzzy expression to a precise search expression is not difficult. However, to look for "a Middle Eastern person," the query may perhaps include a search condition for every country in the Middle East (e.g., nationality = Saudi Arabia or nationality = Egypt or nationality = Syria or …). To look for a "beat-up automobile," too, is rather problematic. To look for "a person whose name sounds like 'Saeed'" is even more problematic, especially if standardized spelling is not used.
One straightforward approach to add fuzzy query capabilities to database systems requires defining a domain-specific vocabulary (that is, all plausible common types of fuzzy search conditions) and then defining for each type of fuzzy search condition equivalent precise search conditions. It appears that many types of fuzzy queries should be amenable to translation to precise queries by using such equivalence mappings.
For certain types of fuzzy queries, the answer sets may include many records, some of which may be more relevant or closer to the answer the user wants than other records. This is similar to the familiar situation where Internet search results contain lots of URLs of different degrees of relevance. So, a means of ranking the records in an answer set should be devised so that the user may be able to pay greater attention to higher-ranked records.
DATABASE-RELATED TECHNOLOGIES Textual Document Search and Management
As noted earlier, textual documents are stored as files and managed by file systems or document management systems.
These systems provide a search mechanism to quickly identify desired documents by keywords and regular expression. Vendors such as Verity, Fulcrum, Hummingbird, Documentum, OpenText, and so forth provide text search engines. Such text search engines are obviously critical in searching a large database of textual documents.
Multimedia Content Recognition and Matching
One longstanding dream for data-processing technologies has been to automatically recognize contents in multimedia data. This includes understanding textual contents (e.g., newspaper articles and books), objects in photographs, scenes in video, contents (and speakers) of speeches, and so forth. Various technologies for recognizing multimedia contents have been available for many years. However, because of the difficulties in developing reliable and accurate algorithms and the computationally intensive nature of the algorithms, the applicable domains have been restricted. The domains relevant to homeland security have included recognizing a limited set of objects in satellite images (e.g. trucks, railroad tracks, buildings, for detecting nuclear weapons or missile sites), matching fingerprints, irises and faces (frontal and side views only), and voices. Even for these restricted domains, it is difficult to automatically identify objects in images and video, match sample multimedia data against databases or even automatically translate textual documents from one language to another. Even the fuzzy color images on the baggage screening machines in airports have to be eyeballed by trained humans to identify banned objects. Because of the inadequacies of technologies, humans usually have to review the results generated by tech- Research into multimedia data matching and multimedia contents recognition relevant to homeland security needs to continue and accelerate. Algorithms for matching multimedia data or isolating and recognizing objects in multimedia contents or understanding the semantics in textual documents are computationally expensive. So, improving the indexing techniques for limiting the search space in large image, audio and video databases is particularly important.
Data mining and Text Mining
Data mining is an interesting and useful technology (Han & Kamber, 2001 ). There are numerous data mining algorithms, such as decision trees, Bayesian networks, neural networks, association rules, nearestneighbor algorithms, clustering algorithms, and so forth. Data mining can be used to segment a dataset based on certain similarity and distance functions (e.g., all creditcard users into three categories in terms of their purchasing behavior). It can be used to assign new data to one of a number of pre-established categories. It can be used to identify certain patterns and trends (e.g., customers purchase behavior, long-distance calling behavior …). It can also be used to discover certain out-of-the-norm behavior patterns (e.g., the use of stolen credit cards, fraudulent insurance claims by medical doctors). There are many vendors that offer data mining products, including IBM, SAS, SPSS, Business Objects, Oracle, Microsoft, Computer Associates/Platinum, Fair Issac, Salford, and so forth.
Data mining can be a useful aid to enhancing homeland security. It can be used to identify certain unusual patterns in the movements of funds, terrorist suspects and weapons. Given the secretive nature of such movements, the patterns are likely outlier data. Data mining is rooted in statistics, and the results of data mining are not always definitive. The inaccuracy can become more pronounced when the database contains a large proportion of dirty data, as dirty data gets into the samples taken to train and validate the data mining models. As such, the results of data mining must be carefully analyzed by human analysts and confirmed by other means. Nonetheless, such results can be useful as additional insights and clues in the search for terrorist suspects and their activities. Research needs to continue to improve the predictive accuracy, performance (speed) and scalability, and ease of use of key data mining algorithms. Data mining algorithms that support fuzzy inference or reasoning also need further research. Efforts must also be made to make the process of data mining easier and less time-consuming. The data mining process includes data preparation before running data mining algorithms, iterative running of data mining algorithms with the tuning of the parameters of the data mining algorithms, keeping the training model from becoming stale (unreliable), and so forth. Data preparation includes dirty-data cleansing, data structure transformation, format changes, encoding, sampling, and so forth. The running of the data mining algorithms is only a step in the data mining process. The other steps consume the majority of time and efforts, and have much room for further automation. permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
One special form of data mining, namely, text mining, is also a useful technology for homeland security. Text mining can extract keywords and names from textual documents, and can even offer rudimentary summary of the text. The results of text mining can be used to tag textual documents with metadata, which in turn can be used as keywords for searching and retrieving the documents. The MetaTagger product offered by Interwoven is an example of a product that utilizes text mining technology to create metadata for textual documents. Sheth et al. (2005) discuss how some results of research into semantic Web may be used to discover semantic associations from information on the Web.
RELATED DATA-PROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES
There are other data-processing technologies that can help sharpen and finetine homeland security efforts, besides database and database-related technologies. Let us briefly look at some of the important ones. This discussion is to help put database technology in proper perspective.
The U.S. government has started deploying detectors for radiological, chemical and biological weapons. During the New Year's celebrations in New York City and Chicago, and major college Bowl (football) games, government security agents and police carrying such detectors mingled in the massive crowds. Such detectors were deployed in the 2004 Summer Olympics in Greece (Brant, 2003) . It is likely that their use will increase in large public events, as well as airports and seaports in the U.S. and elsewhere.
Terrorists are known to make good use of the Internet. They send and receive e-mails and enter chat rooms, often using computers in Internet cafes. It is not clear if the U.S. government is able to track down e-mail senders and chat-room visitors. The U.S. government has identified at least some master spammers, hackers who launch denial of service attacks, and those who spread computer viruses and worms. For what it is worth, in his 2003 novel "The Teeth of the Tiger," Tom Clancy describes how a shadowy organization in the U.S. monitors e-mail and cell-phone communications among terrorist suspects and dispatches a team of three special operatives to assassinate the terrorists. Making Internet users' true identities transparent, at least to Internet service providers, and making it impossible to forge e-mail senders' e-mail addresses should be helpful not only in tracking down terrorist suspects, but also the assorted Internet-era slimes, such as spammers and hackers.
Another technology is the RFID. The Department of Defense will require its primary contractors to attach passive (i.e. without batteries) RFID tags on pallets and cases containing such items as packaged meals, chemical and biological warfare suits, and so forth to be delivered to the Department from 2006 (Bacheldor, 2003) . The McCarran Airport in Las Vegas is preparing to use RFID tags on passenger baggage. Each RFID tag contains a unique identifier and passenger/shipper information. Once it is attached to a bag or container, it can be read at each stop, as necessary, as it is moved from one stop to the next. Of course, the tags do not guarantee that the bags do not contain dangerous weapons. However, they can be used to ensure that the bags and passengers travel together.
